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Abstract
Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion
in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory
of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every
conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a
conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have
argued in previous work that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect
to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare
neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not
exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has
nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases.
I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought
insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the
worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels
of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection
between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed
capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states.
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This article is part of a special issue on “Radical disruptions of self-consciousness”,
edited by Thomas Metzinger and Raphaël Millière.
1 Introduction
Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and
thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of
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the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a
HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state (which
might also be viewed as some form of self-consciousness). The HOT theory of
consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is
that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal, 2005).
I have argued in previous work that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to
this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion (Gennaro,
2015, 2020). Somatoparaphrenia is a monothematic delusion and a disorder of
self-awareness characterized by the sense of alienation from parts of one’s body
(Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). It is a bizarre body delusion where one denies ownership
of a limb or an entire side of one’s body. Schizophrenia is a mental disorder which
most commonly manifests itself through auditory hallucinations, paranoid or
bizarre delusions, or disorganized speech and thinking. Thought insertion is the
delusion that some thoughts are not “one’s own” in some sense and are inserted
into one’s mind by someone else (Frith, 1992). Thus, it may seem that a HOT with
a self-referential “I” in its content could not be present.
There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in
which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or lit-
erally), do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs (Bil-
lon, 2016). Once again, there seems to be a stunning abnormality of self-awareness
in these patients which may also shed light on the very connection between con-
scious states and self-consciousness. Although it will be useful to compare and con-
trast Cotard syndrome with somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, I will argue
that HOT theory also has nothing to fear from it and can consistently account for
what happens in such unusual cases. More specifically, in section 2, I explain HOT
theory emphasizing the features which play a prominent role in later sections. In
section 3, I present a relatively brief discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought
insertion in order to set the stage for addressing Cotard syndrome. In section 4,
I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of the previous section and argue that HOT
theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without fear of inconsistency.
It will also be crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” (that is,
“I-concepts”) and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced ex-
planation of the relationship between conscious mental states and self-awareness.
In section 5, I shift to a related and important ambiguity in self-awareness with
respect to the problem of personal identity. In section 6, I offer some concluding
thoughts.
2 HOT theory
One question that should be answered by any theory of consciousness is: What
makes a mental state a conscious mental state? There is a long tradition that has at-
tempted to understand consciousness in terms of some kind of higher-order aware-
ness. For example, John Locke (1689) once said that “consciousness is the percep-
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tion of what passes in a man’s own mind.” This intuition has been revived by a
number of contemporary philosophers (Lycan, 1996; Rosenthal, 1997, 2005). The
general idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of
some kind of higher-order representation (HOR). A mental state M becomes con-
scious when there is a HOR of M. So, for example, my desire to drink some water
becomes conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of the desire. Intuitively,
it seems that conscious states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are mental states
that I am “aware of” in some sense. This is sometimes referred to as the Transitivity
Principle (TP):
(TP) A conscious state is a state whose subject is, in some way, aware of being in.
Conversely, the idea that I could be having a conscious state while totally unaware
of being in that state seems odd or perhaps even contradictory. A mental state
of which the subject is completely unaware is clearly an unconscious state. For
example, I would not be aware of having a subliminal perception and thus it is an
unconscious perception. Any theory which attempts to explain consciousness in
terms of higher-order states is known as a higher-order representational theory
of consciousness. The most common division of HOR theories is between higher-
order thought (HOT) theories and higher-order perception (HOP) theories. HOT
theorists, such as David Rosenthal, think it is better to understand the HOR as
thoughts involving some kind of conceptual component. HOP theorists urge that
the HOR is a perceptual or experiential state of some kind which does not require
the kind of conceptual content invoked by HOT theorists (Lycan, 1996). Although
HOT and HOP theorists agree on the need for a HOR theory of consciousness,
they disagree on the superiority of their respective positions (such as in Rosenthal,
2004). I focus on HOT theory here because I have defended the theory in previous
publications, but also because it is the HOT concepts that generate the apparent ob-
jections and HOT theory lends itself to a far more interesting discussion regarding
varieties of self-awareness.
It should be noted that higher-order thought theorists agree that one must be-
come aware of the lower-order (LO) mental state noninferentially. We might sup-
pose with Rosenthal, for example, that the HOT must be caused noninferentially
by the LO state in order to make it conscious. The subject is directly aware of the
LO state. The point of this condition is mainly to rule out some alleged counterex-
amples to HOT theory, such as cases where I become aware of my unconscious
desire to kill my boss because I have consciously inferred it from a session with a
psychiatrist, or where my envy becomes conscious after making inferences based
on my own behavior. The characteristic feel of such a conscious desire or envy may
be absent in these cases, but since awareness of them arose via conscious inference,
the HOT theorist accounts for them by adding this noninferential condition.
It might seem that HOT theory results in circularity by defining consciousness
in terms of HOTs. It also might seem that an infinite regress results because a
conscious mental state must be accompanied by a HOT, which, in turn, must be
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accompanied by another HOT ad infinitum. However, the widely accepted reply is
that when a conscious mental state is a first-order world-directed state the higher-
order thought (HOT) is not itself conscious. When the HOT is itself conscious,
there is a yet higher-order (or third-order) thought directed at the second-order
state. In this case, we have introspection which involves a conscious HOT directed
at an inner mental state. When one introspects, one’s attention is directed back
into one’s mind. As we shall see, this distinction is crucial to the discussion which
follows.
It is worth mentioning that most versions of representationalism are reduc-
tionistic regarding consciousness which, for many, is part of the attraction. One
motivation for representationalism is that a naturalistic account of intentionality
or representation can arguably be more easily attained, such as via causal theories
whereby mental states are understood as representing outer objects by virtue of
some reliable causal connection. The idea, then, is that if consciousness can be ex-
plained in representational terms and representation can be understood in purely
physical terms, then there is the promise of a naturalistic theory of consciousness.
Most representationalists think that there is then room for a “second-step” reduc-
tion to be filled in later by neuroscience. HOT theorists also tend to endorse this
line of argument (Gennaro, 2012, chapter two).
3 Somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion
Somatoparaphrenia is a bizarre delusion characterized by the sense of alienation
from parts of one’s body (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Patients with it often deny own-
ership of a limb or an entire side of their body. Somatoparaphrenia might seem to
threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness
since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious
state. Liang and Lane (2009), for example, initially argued that at least one specific
case of somatoparaphrenia is problematic for HOT theory because it contradicts
the notion that, when I am in a conscious state, I must have the accompanying
HOT that “I am in mental state M.” The “I” is not only importantly self-referential
but essential in tying the conscious state to oneself and thus to one’s ownership of
M.
Rosenthal (2010) responds that one can be aware of bodily sensations in two
ways which, normally at least, go together: (a) awareness of a bodily sensation as
one’s own, and (b) awareness of a bodily sensation as having some bodily location,
like a hand or foot. Patients with somatoparaphrenia still experience the sensation
as their own but also as having a mistaken bodily location. These patients still do
have the awareness in (a), which is the main issue at hand, but they have a very
strange awareness in sense (b) which leads them to misidentify the bodily location
of the sensation in someone else. Lane and Liang (2010) protest that Rosenthal
has still not explained why the identification of the bearer of the sensation cannot
also go astray in somatoparaphenia, especially since Rosenthal clearly holds that
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misrepresentation can otherwise occur between a HOT and its target mental state.
A HOT theorist might also argue that there are really two conscious states that
seem to be at odds (Gennaro, 2015). There is a conscious feeling in a limb but also
the (conscious) attribution of the limb to someone else. It is crucial to emphasize
that somatoparaphrenia is often characterized as a delusion of belief under the
broader category of anosognosia (Prigatano, 2010). A delusion is often defined as
a false belief that is held based on an incorrect (and probably unconscious) infer-
ence about external reality or one self that is firmly sustained despite what almost
everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious
proof or evidence to the contrary (Bortolotti, 2009). Beliefs are themselves often
taken to be intentional states integrated with other beliefs and mental states. They
are typically understood to be caused by perceptions or experiences which, in turn,
lead to action or behavior. Thus, somatoparaphrenia seems closer to self-deception
and involves frequent confabulation. If this is a reasonable interpretation, then a
HOT theorist can argue that the patient actually has the following two conscious
states:
S1: a conscious feeling (i.e., a tactile sensation) in the limb in question, and
S2: a conscious belief that the limb (and thus sensation) belongs to someone else.
Having both S1 and S2, especially if both conscious at any given time, is indeed
strange and perhaps even contradictory in some sense but the puzzlement has
nothing to do with HOT theory itself (but see also Lane, 2015, for much more on
this debate). The patient would simply have a different unconscious HOT directed
at S1 and S2.
Schizophrenia is a mental disorder which most commonly manifests itself
through auditory hallucinations, paranoid or bizarre delusions, or disorganized
speech and thinking. Thought insertion is the delusion that some thoughts are not
“one’s own” in some sense or are being inserted into one’s mind by someone else
(Frith, 1992). The puzzle of thought insertion is thus perhaps somewhat analogous
to somatoparaphrenia. For example, just as we might distinguish between experi-
encing a sensation as one’s own as opposed to its bodily location in patients with
somatoparaphrenia, so we might distinguish between experiencing a thought as
one’s own as opposed to its causal origin in patients with schizophrenia. Those
with somatoparaphrenia attribute a limb or a sensation to someone else whereas
some schizophrenics attribute thoughts (or at least their causal origin) to someone
else. If this rough similarity is correct, then a HOT theorist might argue that the
schizophrenic patient has the following two conscious states:
S1: a conscious thought in one’s own mind, and
S2: a conscious belief that the thought in S1 has been inserted by someone else.
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Having both S1 and S2, especially if both are conscious at any given time, is again
very strange and perhaps even irrational, but the puzzlement is not a problem for
HOT theory. In S1, we can suppose that the patient has a HOT about her own first-
order conscious thought, i.e. she is aware of a mental state occurring in her mind.
In S2, the patient also has a conscious belief that S1 has been inserted into her
mind by someone else. Once again, and analogous to somatoparaphrenia, there is
an essentially delusional element involved in schizophrenia and inserted thoughts.
Why or how S2 is generated is of course an interesting and difficult question in its
own right. For example, as Stephens and Graham (2000) suppose, perhaps the best
explanation is that S2 is consciously or unconsciously inferred from a lack of sense
of agency (or “passivity” experience) or perhaps it is inferred from a perceived lack
of causal origin. But none of the alternative explanations cause trouble specifically
for HOT theory’s ability to explain S1. Just as HOT theory says about all conscious
states, when a patient is aware of having a (first-order) conscious thought, there is
a HOT about that thought (Gennaro, 2020).
In both of the above disorders, there is a conscious thought (S1) which can
be explained by a HOT theorist in the usual way, but there is a second belief or
thought which apparently contradicts the first one (S2). Recall also that HOT the-
ory comes with a well-known noninferentiality condition, such that a HOT must
involve awareness of its target mental state noninferentially, that is, in an unmedi-
ated way. This is important because if there is any kind of conscious inference to a
belief, such as in S2, then the HOT would not arise in the requisite manner for its
target mental state to be conscious. More importantly, however, using conscious
inference and reasoning to become aware of a mental state is much more likely
to occur via introspection, that is, by consciously thinking about one’s own mental
states. Notice that S2 is more of an introspective state with a belief directed at a
mental state. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that delusional thinking will
generate further false beliefs.
Notice that this also fits nicely with HOT the ory which can explain why there
would seem to be a phenomenological sense of “myness” or “ownership” when one
introspects, namely, that the HOT is itself conscious. By contrast, it is doubtful
that such a sense is present when one has an unconscious HOT. The concept “I” is
part of a conscious HOT in the introspective case but it is part of an unconscious
thought in the first-order case. Nonetheless, it is certainly true that when there is a
disturbance or abnormality in one’s I-concept, such as one’s bodily representation,
one’s consciousness will be altered and result in some odd feelings of body or
thought disownership.
With regard to any potential misrepresentation between a HOT and its target,
recall the worry that there could equally be the possibility of a mismatch between
the “I” in the HOT and the “I” in the first-order mental state. But it is unclear
how this could be so. Consider Wittgenstein’s (1958) distinction between the “I-
as-subject” (e.g., “I have a pain”) and the “I-as-object” (“I have a broken arm”). Note
that what he called the “I-as-subject” seems to involve some kind of minimal re-
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maining sense of “ownership” even in the most extreme cases of thought insertion.
This minimal sense can be the extent to which a HOT theorist allows for a HOT
that “I am in mental state M” with regard to S1 even if the patient also has the
other conscious state as in S2. Crucially, however, there is never an I-as-object in
the content of the first-order conscious state while there is an implicit (and uncon-
scious) I-as-subject at the second-order level as well as an I-as-object in a typical
HOT. According to HOT theory, there would only be an I-as-subject concept in a
first-order state whereas the content of the state refers to the outer world. After
all, if we assume that any mental state must have a bearer, then even first-order
states should involve some primitive concept of I. The same is true for the uncon-
scious HOT that accompanies a first-order conscious state, but here there is also
an I-as-object referenced in the content of the HOT (i.e., “I think that I am in M”).
Still, these I-concepts are usually parts of unconscious thoughts and so there is
little reason to suppose that there is any phenomenological sense of “myness” or
“ownership” in these first-order cases. However, when one introspects and has a
conscious HOT directed at a mental state, there is not only a conscious I-as-subject
concept but also a conscious I-as-object concept in the content of the HOT which
may account for any subjective sense of myness. So there could be no mis match
between an I-as-object in the content of a mental state M and its HOT because
there isn’t an I-as-object concept at all in the content of M itself.
4 Cotard syndrome
Cotard syndrome is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delu-
sional belief that they are dead, do not exist, are putrefying, or have lost their blood
or internal organs (Billon, 2016). Importantly, most patients also have severe de-
pression and anxiety problems, not to mention the way that they describe their
self-related and very odd experiences. Some bizarre patient accounts are as follows:
She had the constant experience of having no identity or “self” and
being only a body without content….she was convinced that her brain
had vanished, her intestines had disappeared, and her whole body was
translucent.
(Debruyne, Portzky, Van den Eynde, & Audenaert, 2009, p. 197)
He said “I speak, breathe and eat, but I am dead”.
(Nejad & Toofani, 2005, p. 250)
It was as if it was not me walking, it was not me talking, as if it was
not me living […] I can look at me, I am somehow bothered by my
body, as if it wasn’t me, as if I lived on the side of my body, on the side
of myself if you like. I don’t know how to explain.
(Janet & Raymond, 1898, p. 70)
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One general difficulty is just how literally to take the reports of Cotard patients.
Should we take them at face value or treat them with some skepticism given the
delusional aspect in question? Young and Leafhead (1996, p. 154), for example,
note that there is no symptom or symptom complex present in all the patients de-
scribed by Cotard and that this “gives grounds for arguing that the term ‘Cotard’s
syndrome’ should be used cautiously; at best it represents an idealized pattern
which in practice is not found even in pure cases.” Further, Cotard patients some-
times speak in more qualified terms, such as it is “as if” I do not exist or have a
body (as above in the third quotation).
Like somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, one might again suppose that
Cotard syndrome threatens the HOT theory of consciousness. Recall that HOT
theory requires that a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” accompanies
each conscious state. But if I believe that I don’t exist, for example, then it would
seem that I do not really have a self-referencing HOT. Depending upon the specific
Cotard patient, the “I-concept” would not seem to refer to her “self” or her “body”
or her “mind.” So any analogy to thought insertion or somatoparaphrenia might
depend to some extent on which quotation we focus on. When some aspect of
one’s body is denied or feels alienated, perhaps it is more like somatoparaphrenia.
When a mental state is denied or feels alienated, it is somewhat closer to thought
insertion. It is difficult to grasp what it must be like to experience these abnormal
conditions but we must also keep in mind the delusional element found in all three
cases.
I will mainly focus here on cases where a patient apparently denies her own
existence or “self,” sometimes called the “nihilistic delusion” (Radovic, 2017) which
goes back originally to Jules Cotard (1882); see also (Metzinger, 2003). This is one
difference between someone with Cotard syndrome and those with somatopara-
phrenia and thought insertion. Billon (2016) argues that Cotard syndrome is the
delusional counterpart of depersonalization disorders which are dissociative disor-
ders marked by periods of feeling disconnected or detached from one’s body and
thoughts. A Cotard patient also has an impaired self-awareness and the feeling
that there is no “I” in some sense. Billon says that “…depersonalised patients are
not delusional: they refuse to endorse the belief that they do not think and exist”
(2016, p. 370) but he also points out that the “border between mere depersonal-
isation and the Cotard syndrome might not be always clear-cut” (2016, fn. 22).
He then goes on to explain that “[g]iven the similarity between the experience of
depersonalised patients and that of Cotard patients, what differentiates [them] is
plausibly some kind of rationality deficit […]” (Billon, 2016, p. 380).
In any case, consider the following statements:
At times she would say, “I am no longer alive”; “I am dead”. (Enoch &
Ball, 2001, p. 159)
He often said, “I am a ghost” or “I am dead”, and sometimes denied the
existence of certain parts of his body saying, for example, “I have no
blood”. (Enoch & Ball, 2001, p. 165)
Gennaro R. J. (2020). Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts. Philosophy and the Mind
Sciences, 1(I), 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.41
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts 9
[It is like] seeing life as if it were played like a film in a movie. But in
that case where am I? Who is watching the film? (Simeon & Abugel,
2006, p. 15)
But notice first that even the statement that “I am dead” still contains an initial
reference to oneself (at least as a grammatical fact). It seems to me that there will
always be some reference to oneself when expressing any kind of thought or belief
(even if delusional, irrational, or self-contradictory in some other way). Of course
this is precisely what leads to an apparent contradiction. Imagine: “Who thinks
that you don’t exist?” Answer: “I do”? “Who is dead?” Answer: “I am”? Again,
perhaps this is merely a misleading way of speaking but the same might be true
of other patient reports.
Still, we can see how the pattern of reply above to somatoparaphrenia and
thought insertion can be applied here as well. That is, we may suppose that at
least some Cotard patients have the following two conscious states:
S1: a conscious feeling or experience of unfamiliarity with myself (or body or mental
states); and
S2: a conscious belief or thought that I am dead or I do not exist.
Here, once again, having both S1 and S2 is indeed strange and perhaps even self-
contradictory in some sense, but it still wouldn’t tell against HOT theory. In S1,
we can suppose that the patient has a HOT about her own feeling or experience,
that is, she is aware of her feeling or mental state. In S2, the patient also has a
conscious belief or thought that she does not exist.
How or why S2 is generated is of course interesting in its own right. For exam-
ple, perhaps the best explanation is that S2 is simply generated by the unfamiliar
feeling or experience described in S1. This would be a so-called “endorsement” ac-
count. But there are at least two possibilities here, namely, the endorsement and
the explanationist theories of delusion formation. The endorse ment account holds
that delusions are formed by endorsing as veridical the content of the unusual ex-
perience (Bayne & Pacherie, 2004) whereas the explanationist account holds that
delusions are formed as a way to explain (or rationalize) an unusual experience
(Maher, 1999). One way to frame these two theories of delusion formation is by
asking the following question: Is the delusional belief formed sometime prior to
the person having the abnormal conscious experi ence or sometime afterward? Al-
ternatively, we might ask: Are delusions bizarre convictions that alter one’s way of
seeing the world, or are they hypotheses formulated to account for some unusual
experiences and then endorsed as beliefs? In the previous discussion I have per-
haps shown more sympathy with the explanationist account but, as Langdon and
Bayne (2010) point out, most delusions are likely hybrids of both views especially
when we consider them over periods of time. They propose a continuum from “re-
ceived” to “reflective” delu sion, whereby the former largely come to pass initially
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via the endorsement process and the latter are formed mainly by an explanationist
processes. Langdon and Bayne (2010) also importantly distinguish between “spon-
taneous” and “provoked” confabulation where the latter arises only in response to
direct questioning. After all, what makes these patient dialogues so compelling
and bizarre are their rather stunning confabulations in response to questions.
Thus, in some ways, I am rather sympathetic with Young’s two-stage “interac-
tionist account” of the Cotard delusion (Young, 2012). He tells us that the interac-
tionist explanation incorporates, for example, Ratcliffe’s (2008)
emphasis on existential change and disturbed phenomenology, but at
the same time acknowledges the necessary role played by some form
of second-stage cognitive disruption […] Furthermore, the interaction-
ist approach holds that the formation of the delusional belief alters the
nature of the phenomenal experience, such that what is perceived […]
is actually oneself dead or immortal (in the case of the Cotard delu-
sion). (Young, 2012, p. 136)
Additionally, we might even suppose that there are unconscious inferences which
we, by definition, wouldn’t be aware of making. It may even be that S2 is initially
generated, at least in part, via unconscious reasoning designed to “make sense of”
or rationalize the experience involved in S1. Surely delusional rationalizing need
not always be a conscious process especially during spontaneous confabulations.
Of course, once S2 is generated, then it may be used thereafter to affect or interpret
first-order feelings or experiences. Notice also that the noninferential condition
on HOT theory does not rule out unconscious inferences playing some role in
generating an introspective state. Rather, it only rules out that S1 itself is or feels
conscious in the same way when it arises via conscious inference.
In any case, regardless of the alternative explanations for the genesis of S2, Co-
tard syndrome as such does not seem to cause trouble specifically for HOT theory’s
ability to explain S1 or S2. Just as HOT theory says about all conscious states, when
a patient is aware of having a (first-order) conscious feeling or experience, there
is a HOT about that state. This is what we have in the case of S1. But we should
also recognize the delusional element involved in the formation of S2. There are
of course situations where those with Cotard syndrome might even realize that
they have come to think or believe contradictory things based on their abnormal
experiences.
To be clear: I do not mean to suggest that the discussion above on endorsement
and explanationist theories of delusion results either in some novel view of mine
in relation to Cotard syndrome or that my view depends essentially on arguments
contained in one of those accounts. The main point is rather that no matter how
or when S2 is generated with respect to S1, HOT theory is not threatened and is
indeed consistent with both S1 and S2. Still, HOT theory does have a natural way
to account for S2 as more of an introspective state. Again, if there is an additional
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and particularly unique issue posed by Cotard, it is with respect to cases of self-
denial (“nihilistic delusions”), not with respect to HOT theory’s ability to account
for S1 and S2.
With regard to any potential misrepresentation between a HOT and its own tar-
get, it is again important to note that some kind of minimal “I-as-subject” seems
to remain even in the most extreme cases of Cotard syndrome. This minimal I-
concept can merely be the extent to which a HOT theorist allows for a HOT that
“I am in mental state M” with regard to S1. But there is never an I-as-object in the
content of the first-order conscious state; rather, there is an implicit (and uncon-
scious) I-as-subject at the second-order level as well as an I-as-object in a typical
HOT. According to HOT theory, there would only be an I-as-subject concept in the
first-order state. However, when one introspects and has a conscious HOT directed
at a mental state, there is not only a conscious I-as-subject concept but also a con-
scious I-as-object concept in the content of the conscious HOT that may account
for any further subjective sense of myness or ownership. Again, there would be
no potentially problematic mis match between an I-as-object in the content of a
mental state M and its HOT because there isn’t an I-as-object concept at all in the
content of M itself.
In terms of the general topic of this special issue, “can there be states of con-
sciousness that lack any kind of self-consciousness?”, then, the answer partly de-
pends upon how one defines “self-consciousness”, and there are clearly various no-
tions of self-consciousness or self-awareness ranging from very minimal to very
sophisticated. I have previously argued at length that conscious states and con-
scious creatures (including most animals) are self-conscious in at least one sense;
namely, that each conscious state is accompanied by a HOT and so any conscious
creature has HOTs (Gennaro, 1996). For various reasons I won’t repeat here, I also
urged that a plausible minimal form of self-consciousness is simply having any
kind of higher-order or meta-psychological thought. This can include any HOT,
conscious or not, and even those containing such minimal I-concepts as “bodily
self-awareness”; that is, distinguishing one’s own body from other things. So we
are continuously “aware of” our mental states but this awareness is generally not
a conscious awareness unless we are also attending to our mental states, in which
case we have an unconscious third-order awareness of the second-order introspec-
tive awareness of the mental state. The answer to the above question would thus be
“no” according to this way of understanding “self-consciousness” and according to
HOT theory. However, my rather rudimentary notion of self-consciousness will
likely not be robust enough to satisfy some philosophers. This is understandable
and it is also partly why we must distinguish various levels of self-consciousness
including the more sophisticated notions discussed in this paper, such as “intro-
spection” as found in HOT theory. In this sense, of course, each conscious state
does not involve self-consciousness according to HOT theory because we can have
conscious states without introspecting them (because conscious states are most of-
ten outer-directed). So if one identifies self-consciousness with introspection, then
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the answer to the above question would be “yes.” Still, Cotard patients do seem
capable of some level of self-awareness and even having some introspective states,
albeit often including some wildly bizarre beliefs or thoughts about themselves
(as in S2). (Actually, it is sometimes also useful to distinguish further between
two kinds of introspection: momentary focused and deliberate (Gennaro, 1996, p.
19). The former is a brief conscious focus on a mental state such as a pain or de-
sire, whereas the latter involves consciously reasoning about our first-order mental
states for a period of time.)
It is worth mentioning here that HOT theory, like many contemporary theo-
ries of consciousness in analytic philosophy of mind, tends to focus on explaining
“state” consciousness, that is, “what makes a mental state conscious?” We some-
times speak of an individual mental state, such as a pain or perception, as conscious.
This is in contrast to “creature” consciousness since we also often speak of organ-
isms or creatures as conscious. Creature consciousness is simply meant to refer
to the fact that an organism is awake or aware of its surroundings, as opposed to
sleeping or in a coma. However, state consciousness is often implied by creature
consciousness and vice versa. For example, a conscious creature will typically have
conscious states and having conscious states are likely only to occur in generally
conscious creatures.
One might wonder how the above discussion relates to what some authors
characterize as “consciousness of oneself” or an “I-concept” specifically involving
the capacity to form I*-sentences or I*-thoughts. The asterisk used here was intro-
duced by Castañeda (1966) and can be found in the literature on de se propositional
attitudes where an intentional state is directed at oneself (Perry, 1979). It is not just
that I can have thoughts or beliefs about myself but that I myself (or I*) realize that
the thought or belief is about me. I may come to realize that the messy shopper
accidentally dropping food in the aisles is me or suddenly realize that the person
in the store mirror is me. So this is clearly a more sophisticated notion of self-
consciousness where one is thinking about oneself as an object. As Baker (2013)
explains, “I* is typically embedded in the”that-clause” of a complex first-person
sentence with a psychological or linguistic main verb” (p. 33), such as “I believe
that I am short.” “I am not only the thinker of the thought but I am also part of the
object of my thought” (pp. 32-33).
With regard to Cotard’s syndrome, on my view, I*-concepts enter the picture
at the point I have called the “I-as-object” at the level of introspection. However,
as we have seen, the delusional element in Cotard patients leads them to have
radically false beliefs about themselves. Further, such beliefs and thoughts are
sometimes directed at their bodies (or body parts) and sometimes directed at their
mental states. As we have seen, this only complicates the matter (more on this in
section 5). But, for example, in extreme forms of Cotard syndrome, as Metzinger
(2003, p. 456) puts it, “we are faced with a delusional belief that can be expressed as
follows: [*I am certain that I* do not exist].” We might similarly suppose that there
is the thought “I think that I* do not exist” which echoes the kind of intentional
state reflected in S2.
Gennaro R. J. (2020). Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts. Philosophy and the Mind
Sciences, 1(I), 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.41
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts 13
My main problem with Baker and others, however, is that she holds that the
“capacity to use I*-language (i.e. a robust first-person perspective) is constitutive
of self-consciousness” (Baker, 2013, p. 39) where “the robust first-person perspec-
tive is to conceive of oneself as oneself* in the first person” (Baker, 2013, p. 35). It
is unclear to me why she doesn’t think that it’s preferable to suppose that there
are degrees of I-concepts and self-consciousness ranging from more basic to rather
sophisticated. Although Baker does allow for a “rudimentary first-person perspec-
tive,” she doesn’t consider anything less than having the more robust complete
mastery of an I-concept as being a genuine self-concept at all. Why suppose that
complete mastery is required for self-consciousness or for having an I-concept?
And why should all self-concept possession be so closely tied to a linguistic ability?
Surely there is room for degrees of concept possession not only for self-concepts
but for most concepts (see Gennaro, 2012, chapters six through eight). This would
also, in turn, open the door to the view that many animals and human infants
are not only conscious but also possess concepts and self-consciousness to some
degree.
It is worth mentioning in this context the way that Guillot explores our sense of
self-awareness, that is, by making a threefold distinction within the more general
notion of “subjective character” as follows:
1. “For-me-ness” is when the “subjective character is a subject’s characteristic
awareness of her experience” (Guillot, 2017, p. 31); that is, the object of self-
awareness is the experience itself.
2. “Me-ness” is when “subjective character is a subject’s awareness of herself as
part of having the experience” (Guillot, 2017, pp. 31–32); that is, what makes
an experience special for its subject is the fact that the subject is somehow
aware of herself.
3. “Mineness” is when subjective character is a subject’s “awareness of herself
as having the experience” (Guillot, 2017, p. 32); that is, subjective character
presents it as a phenomenal awareness that my experiences are mine.
Guillot holds that “the experience of prototypical Cotard patients exhibits
for-me-ness, but neither me-ness nor mineness. She also suggests”that
schizophrenic inserted thoughts might exhibit for-me-ness and me-ness,
but not mineness” (2017, p. 44).
This analysis seems plausible to some extent. For example, Cotard patients do
seem to be aware of a (rather unusual) experience (as reflected in S1) and thus
retain some very minimal sense of self-awareness, but they do not seem to relate
that experience to themselves in any coherent or significant way. As a matter of
fact, they even often explicitly deny that there is a self to which that experience
can be ascribed.
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However, in relation to HOT theory, I have argued elsewhere for indepen-
dent reasons that there isn’t ubiquitous self-awareness (i.e. for-me-ness) that ac-
companies each normal conscious first-order state. For example, I argue specifi-
cally against Kriegel’s self-representationalist view at length (Gennaro, 2008, 2012,
chapter five), that is, against the notion that “for-me-ness” is a form of peripheral
(i.e. non-attentive but conscious) inner awareness. In doing so, I address the dif-
ferences between us with respect to reductionist motivations, as was briefly men-
tioned early in this paper. I also take issue with the phenomenological argument
he adduces in favor of his view. It seems to me that our conscious attention is
often so focused at the world and its objects that it seems unlikely that we are con-
tinuously consciously self-aware. It is also clear that such a view lacks plausibility
especially as compared to the widely accepted and fairly obvious fact of peripheral
outer-directed conscious awareness, such as the awareness in one’s peripheral vi-
sual field while watching a concert or working on one’s computer. Much the same
goes for me-ness and mineness. Again, the HOT is typically unconscious when
directed at a first-order conscious state. Me-ness and mineness, on my view, enter
the picture only upon introspection, that is, when a HOT is consciously directed at
one’s own mental state.
A similar line of response might also be raised against Ford and Smith’s (2006)
argument in favor of the self-representationalist theory of consciousness. The
claim here again is that there is an element of self-awareness – Guillot’s “for-
me-ness” seemingly – internal to every conscious state. Ford and Smith contend
that, for example, cases of depersonalization show that self-representationalism
is correct. But just because the removal of something – for example, normal pro-
prioception – causes deficits in one’s conscious mental states, it surely does not
follow that the awareness of that thing is part of normal conscious experience.
The relation could be causal instead of constitutive. That is, the typical abilities
and awareness in question might merely, in the normal case, causally contribute
to the phenomenology of one’s conscious mental states without being part of the
conscious state itself (see also Howell & Thompson, 2017).
With regard to “bodily self-awareness,” Bermúdez (2011, pp. 161–166), for ex-
ample, distinguishes between a “sense” and a “judgment” of ownership. He argues,
in the end, that the so-called “sense” of ownership is best viewed as a “judgment”
rather than as a feeling itself. In contrast to de Vignemont (2007), Bermúdez re-
jects the “inflationary” conception of the sense of ownership according to which
there is a distinctive positive phenomenology of bodily ownership: “There are
facts about the phenomenology of bodily awareness […] and there are judgments
of ownership, but there is no additional feeling of ownership” (Bermúdez, 2011,
p. 166). There are still of course conscious bodily sensations and proprioceptive
states. What one actually feels is the first-order conscious state accompanied by
the unconscious thought about the mental state, as opposed to any phenomenol-
ogy of so-called “myness”. Recall that HOT theory can explain why there is a
phenomenological sense of myness when one introspects, namely, that the HOT is
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itself conscious whereas no such sense is present when one has an unconscious
HOT. The “I-concept” is part of a conscious thought in the introspective case but
part of an unconscious thought in the outer-directed first-order case. Nonetheless,
it is again certainly true that when there is a disturbance in one’s I-concept (includ-
ing bodily self-awareness), one’s consciousness will likely be altered and result in
some very odd beliefs and feelings of disownership. But, like Bermúdez, I do not
find it compelling to argue that if a deficit of bodily awareness is manifested in con-
sciousness, then that aspect of bodily awareness is normally part of our conscious
states, albeit even in some peripheral way.
5 Self-awareness and personal identity: An
ambiguity
With respect to Cotard patients specifically, Radovic (2017) hints at an interesting
and related aspect of self-awareness which might well explain at least some of their
odd statements:
In order to grasp in what sense Cotard patients believe themselves
to be dead, it might be helpful to take a closer look at different con-
ceptions of death and, in particular, the received notion of biological
death. Biological death may be viewed from two different perspec-
tives: a first-person point of view and a third-person point of view.
From a naturalistic first-person point of view, death is commonly un-
derstood as the permanent absence of consciousness and the disinte-
gration of personhood. Death is the end of our selves as conscious
persons. By contrast, from a naturalistic third-person point of view,
animals such as humans are dead when the heart does not beat, when
there is no respiration, when the body is permanently still, or when
the brain exhibits no neural activity. (Radovic, 2017, p. 688)
This line of analysis brings to mind a related distinction between two conceptions
of “personal identity,” namely, psychological continuity and bodily continuity. The
question raised is often framed as “What makes a person the same person over
time?” Any such discussion in western philosophy tends to begin with the work
of John Locke whose account of personal identity famously appealed to psychology
and, more specifically, to consciousness and memory (Locke, 1689). On his view,
a later person (P2) is identical to an earlier person (P1) just in case P2’s conscious-
ness “can be extended backwards” to P1. This is taken to mean that P2 remembers
P1’s thoughts and experiences, “from the inside” so to speak. My personhood
goes with my first-person perspective and especially with my consciousness and
memory, not necessarily with my body. The basic idea is familiar enough: I have
memories from my first campus visit to the University of Southern Indiana, to ex-
periences back in graduate school at Syracuse University, and so on. You do not
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have those same memories and so my having them makes me the same person
as those previous persons (as opposed to you). They are episodic memories, that
is, I remember them as experienced from the first-person point of view. Episodic
memory is different than what is sometimes called “procedural memory,” that is,
memory for skills and abilities like playing the piano or riding a bike. Of course,
Locke is not saying that a fifty-year-old person must (episodically) remember ev-
erything from one’s earlier life since there is some normal forgetting of one’s own
past.
Although Locke’s view has been dominant in western philosophy, other
philosophers disagree and have put forth what has come to be known as “ani-
malism” which holds that being the same “biological organism” or having the
“same body” is essential to one’s personal identity (Olson, 2007). On this view,
one continues to exist “just in case one’s purely animal functions – metabolism,
the capacity to breathe and circulate one’s blood, and the like – continue” (Olson,
1997, p. 16). To elaborate, Olson explains that “an animal’s life is understood as
a self-organizing biological event that maintains the organism’s complex internal
structure. […] An organism must constantly take in new particles, reconfigure
and assimilate them into its living fabric, and expel those that are no longer useful
to it. An organism’s life enables it to persist and retain its characteristic structure
despite constant material turnover” (Olson, 2007, p. 28).
Interestingly, Locke himself recognized the ambiguity and thus distinguished
between “same person” and “same body” or “same biological organism.” For one
thing, Locke was clearly open to the possibility of something like what is now
called Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) where “two or more persons” can be
associated with “one body.” Locke used the term “same man” to denote to latter.
Radovic (2017) correctly points out that Cotard patients often do seem to in-
dicate that they are dead in the biological sense as opposed to the psychological
sense. Consider:
I find myself regarding existence as though from beyond the tomb,
from another world; […] I am as it were, outside my own body and
individuality; I am depersonalized. (Simeon & Abugel, 2006, p. 133)
I felt that my brain was somewhere else and from there was just watch-
ing me […] I was completely unable to tell whether I was still present
or whether I was the part that was gone. In short, there were two
different beings, the one watching the other. (Roberts, 1960, p. 481)
Much of the above, therefore, highlights the ambiguity of self-reference talk and
the use of “I”. “I am dead” might be taken to mean that “my body is no longer alive
or functioning” or “I am no longer in my body” as opposed to “I am no longer
conscious” or “my conscious existence has ceased.” This could also partly explain
the apparent contradiction in some statements made by Cotard patients. That is,
if such a patient is saying “I am dead” and means it in the biological sense, then
there could still be a sense in which “I am alive” and detached from my body in
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some way, such as immortal or more like a “ghost.” Thus, it seems that something
like “bodily self-awareness” still lingers in the background (perhaps more like so-
matoparaphrenia):
At one point he had stated that he was a ghost and that no one could
see him. He explained that his physical body had been transformed
into the immaterial body of a ghost. Nevertheless, he indicated that
he visualized his body without any difficulty. About 2 months prior
to admission he had concluded that eating was unnecessary since he
was already dead. (Silva, Leong, Weinstock, & Gonzales, 2000, p. 188)
He often said, “I am a ghost” or “I am dead”, and sometimes denied the
existence of certain parts of his body saying, for example, “I have no
blood.” (Enoch & Ball, 2001, p. 165)
This suggests that Cotard patients often refer to themselves in third-person terms
rather than in first-person terms.
Recall our two earlier statements:
S1: a conscious feeling or experience of unfamiliarity with myself (or body parts or
mental states); and
S2: a conscious belief or thought that I am dead or I do not exist.
In light of this discussion, it may even be the case that S1 and S2 are not really in
direct conflict at all. That is, Cotard patients may sometimes be referring to their
bodies (or body parts) in S2 whereas S1 reflects a more first-person perspective
on their own mental states. This is somewhat similar to Wittgenstein’s distinction
between the “I-as-subject” and the “I-as-object” whereby the former may indicate
a first-person point of view and the latter a third-person point of view.
Thus, with respect to HOT theory, the I-concept referent in a HOT might vary
depending upon several factors, including which disorder or delusion we are ad-
dressing. It might refer to one’s own body as a sort of bodily self-awareness, per-
haps more like somatoparaphrenia. It might refer to one’s own mental state, per-
haps closer to thought insertion. But it might even refer to one’s own existence. It
seems rather uncontroversial to say that are different self-concepts and some are
more relevant than others under certain conditions. Billon makes a related point
when he suggests that at least sometimes, Cotard patients “feel more entitled to
refer to themselves in the third-person than in the first-person” (2016, p. 376).
Along somewhat similar lines, it is worth mentioning that some Cotard patient
reports seem to resemble descriptions of out-of-body experiences (OBEs). An OBE
occurs when one experiences one’s own body (or even the world) from above or
outside one’s body. You feel like you left your body and are “floating” above it.
This seems to indicate that your “mind” or “soul” is separating out from your body.
A materialist may of course explain how very similar experiences can be induced
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by stimulating neurons in the temporo-parietal junction (Blanke & Arzy, 2005).
Although Cotard patients can have a wide variety of neurological and psychiatric
pathologies, at least some have been known to have abnormalities in the temporo-
parietal area (Kudlur, George, & Jaimon, 2007).
6 Conclusion
In closing, then, we have seen that various psychopathologies of self-awareness
might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory
of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accom-
pany every conscious state. The same might be said of Cotard syndrome but, by
analogy with somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, I have argued that HOT
theory can answer this objection and can consistently account for what happens in
this admittedly unusual case. There are possibly irrational combinations of mental
states but HOT theory has the resources to explain why they do not cause trouble
for the theory. There are also multiple “I-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can
help to provide a more nuanced explanation. For example, there would not really
be any “self-concept” mismatch between a conscious state and its HOT. In addi-
tion, Wittgenstein’s distinction between “I-as-subject” and “I-as-object” as well as
different approaches to the problem of personal identity can aid us in understand-
ing how apparently contradictory claims can be explained away. Finally, with
regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it seems
clear from the above discussion that Cotard patients are capable of having some
“I-thoughts” about their bodies and minds which seem to indicate various degrees
of self-awareness. As we have seen, they do think about themselves in various
ways. So I do not suppose that Cotard syndrome is characterized by a total lack
of self-consciousness. However, perhaps not surprisingly given their delusional
nature, many such thoughts about themselves are often rather bizarre and clearly
false.
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